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ABSTRACT
Democracies are experiencing historic disruptions affecting how
people engage with core institutions such as the press, civil
society organizations, parties, and elections. These processes of
citizen interaction with institutions operate as a democratic
interface shaping self-government and the quality of public life.
The electoral dimension of the interface is important, as its
operation can affect all others. This analysis explores a growing
left-right imbalance in the electoral connection between citizens,
parties, elections, and government. This imbalance is due, in part,
to divergent left-right preferences for political engagement,
organization, and communication. Support on the right for clearer
social rules and simpler moral, racial and nationalist agendas are
compatible with hierarchical, leader-centered party organizations
that compete more effectively in elections. Parties on the left
currently face greater challenges engaging citizens due to the
popular meta-ideology of diversity and inclusiveness and
demands for direct or deliberative democracy. What we term
connective parties are developing technologies to perform core
organizational functions, and some have achieved electoral
success. However, when connective parties on the left try to
develop shared authority processes, online and offline, they face
significant challenges competing with more conventionally
organized parties on the right.
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Democratic systems are suffering disruptions in many nations. Perhaps the most impor-
tant disconnect between citizens and institutions is in the area of parties and elections. The
weakening of modern era social institutions such as unions and other group membership
organizations has eroded traditional bases of party support. In addition, global business
pressure to privatize public goods and expand market solutions have reduced policy
and ideological differences among center parties, both left and right (Crouch, 2004). As
the political center becomes ‘hollowed out’ – to use Mair’s (2013) term – voter identifi-
cation weakens, electoral marketing communication becomes less effective, and compe-
tition for votes increases from new parties (and resurgent older ones) on the political
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extremes. Many of the new parties have taken unconventional or ‘hybrid’ (Chadwick,
2013) organizational forms because of factors such as scarce resources, adoption of social
media communication strategies, or thin professional staffing beyond dominant founding
personalities.
A puzzling element in the midst of this disruption is that radical right parties have done
better than the left in electoral terms. Our data show just how large this imbalance at the
electoral interface has become, despite the comparable numbers of voters, both left and
right, who have been adversely affected by social and economic change, and who have
doubts about the legitimacy of center parties and about democracy itself. This article
explores the underpinnings of this electoral puzzle through the lenses of organization,
communication, and technology.
The argument revolves around the idea that divergent preferences are emerging
between citizens on the left and the right for how to organize the electoral linkage between
society and state. A vertical bureaucratic model has long dominated conventional party
politics, and has been adapted by most parties on the radical right. By contrast, substantial
numbers of voters, primarily on the left, are developing preferences for horizontal models
that favor direct, participatory, deliberative democracy – even in the electoral arena. This
demand for more distributed party and campaign organization puts parties that supply
such horizontal organization at a disadvantage in electoral contests where conventional
organizations are often better able to coordinate communication, use conventional
media, develop campaign strategy, and mobilize voters.
With so many center parties feeling pressure from citizen defection, many have experi-
mented with uses of communication technologies to boost engagement. However, many
observers remain skeptical about how meaningful such outreach affordances really are,
either for party members and voters or for parties (e.g., Chadwick & Stromer-Galley,
2016; Gauja, 2016; Gibson, Greffet, & Cantijoch, 2017). In this context of organizational
experimentation and change, we note a special set of cases in which technologies of
engagement are not just grafted onto existing bureaucratic organization, but actually
replace core bureaucratic functions. What we call ‘connective parties’ replace such core
operations as agenda setting and candidate selection with a mix of in-person assemblies
coordinated through technology platforms and affordances. In some cases, these party
‘operating systems’ have developed from necessity, as happened when Beppe Grillo’s
Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy grew quickly into a national political force beyond
the management capacity of Grillo and a few allies. In other cases, connective parties
have attempted to strike a balance between movement demands for direct democracy
and the need for central leadership, as with Píratar in Iceland, Alternativet in Denmark,
and Podemos in Spain. We explore this tension in all of these cases, noting that in particu-
lar Podemos represents an interesting example of this persistent tension between central
leadership and connective organization, resulting in splits in party leadership and the
defection of some of its movement base.
These tensions between traditional bureaucratic organization and technology-enabled
distributed democracy play out differently across cases, but often become more limiting on
the radical left, where organizational preferences for direct democracy are most pro-
nounced. These developments have implications for the nature of democracy itself and
for the role of parties and elections in its future. We navigate this argument with caution,
as the current electoral landscape is filled with anomalies and uncharted developments,
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such as the Brexit vote in the UK, the election of Donald Trump in the US, the victory of
Emmanuel Macron’s unconventional En Marche! Party in France, and the rise of anti-
democratic parties in various democracies.
The current era of economic turbulence and political turmoil has generated new pat-
terns of political organization and communication, few of which may turn into stable
new institutional arrangements at the democratic interface. However, against this back-
drop of change, our data from European democracies reveals a left-right divergence of citi-
zen engagement preferences that favors political parties on the radical right. It is true that
center parties are still in government in most nations, but it is also clear that many voters
are searching for alternatives. Even more disturbing is that support for democracy itself is
in decline across Europe and the US, particularly among younger age cohorts (Foa &
Mounk, 2016). In the context of this crisis of democracy, disproportionate electoral
gains on the right become more worrisome, as many parties advocate restrictions on
immigration, and generally promote intolerance for diversity and basic rights among
established minority populations. Even more extensive threats to established democratic
principles have emerged in nations where right wing parties have entered government
(e.g., Poland, Hungary, and Turkey) and imposed serious restrictions on the press, aca-
demic freedom, and other basic liberties. Thus, our focus on politics beyond the center,
along with our assessment of why center parties have had trouble re-establishing voter loy-
alty, offers a full spectrum look at the future of democracy itself.
The democratic interface in the electoral arena
The democratic interface can be understood as the communication and organization pro-
cesses that engage citizens with institutions of collective self-governance. It is possible to
describe citizen interfaces with the press, the courts, civil society organizations, social
movements, and other institutions thought to constitute democratic societies. In this
analysis we focus on the electoral interface, which may affect how all of the others operate.
In particular, we examine the demand for different kinds of political organization from
party followers, and the role of communication technology in meeting (or not meeting)
those demands as parties experiment with various forms of organization.
The electoral interface in modern representative democracies hinges on the notion of
institutional linkages between society and government. The organization and communi-
cation of linkage is commonly perceived to be one of the most important functions that
political parties perform: they are seen as key mechanisms for articulating and aggregating
the ‘raw’ flow of interests and ideas into comprehensive programs for collective govern-
ance (Almond, 1960, pp. 35–36; Sartori, 1976). At present, two distinct models are emer-
ging for what electoral linkage entails and how it is achieved.
Although the electoral interface is theoretically malleable, there are strong pressures to
conform to similar organizational forms during any given historical period. In the cur-
rently dominant model, parties organize linkage in a top-down or centre-out manner
that increasingly detaches citizen engagement from core organizational processes, except
through communication-based appeals during elections. This marks an historical depar-
ture from the mass parties of the mid-twentieth century in which channeling the interests
of cleavage-based membership groups was the benchmark of party democracy. The break-
down of traditional party cleavages, and the movements that defined them, led to what
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have been termed ‘catch-all’ parties that de-emphasized ideology and offered marketable
programs to different groups (Kirchheimer, 1966). More recently, with the rising influ-
ence of business, and the defection of voter support bases, the center has shifted toward
so-called ‘cartel parties’ that collude to secure state benefits and coalition advantages
(Katz & Mair, 2009). Recent comparative mapping reveals surprising uniformity in
party structures within countries (Poguntke et al., 2016). There are, of course, variations
in party culture and ideology, as when parties prioritize inclusiveness or strong leadership,
or connections with (or distance from) social movements (Chiru, Gauja, Ghergina, &
Rodriguez-Tenuel, 2015; Gauja, 2016; Hutter, 2014; Scarrow, 2015, chapter 2).
As these transitions in party organization pushed citizens farther from the ideational and
organizational work of parties, election campaigns came to rely increasingly on marketing
strategies to assemble voters through professionalized party communications and person-
alized focus on party leaders (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). The reliance on professional
marketing, branding and spin all reinforce vertical models of linkage and engagement:
leader-focused, centralized, bureaucratic organizations that market finished programs to
the public. Both the vertical organizational forms, and the communication processes that
mirror them, reinforce what has been criticized as the ‘hollowing out’ of the established
parties in terms of public ideas and citizen engagement (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2013).
As campaign communication from the center appears hollow and ineffective to grow-
ing numbers of citizens, grassroots preferences for new democratic linkages are introdu-
cing instability into elections. Indeed, the array of organizational preferences spans a
spectrum from more expert-led efficiency to growing demands for more direct partici-
pation in democratic processes (Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009; Close, Kelbel, & Van
Haute, 2017; Font, Wojcieszak, & Navarro, 2015; Webb, 2013). Many conventional politi-
cal organizations have trouble satisfying preferences for flexible and autonomous engage-
ment that blur distinctions between member-participant and voter-supporter within and
beyond electoral politics (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2012). In particular, traditional
bureaucratic parties struggle to satisfy demand for very different kinds of democratic lin-
kages that can loosely be termed horizontal, based on the shared generation of ideas, flex-
ible yet meaningful engagement, and organizational processes that draw input from the
periphery as well as center.
What seems clear is that, despite being well aware of this changing mix of voter
demands, few center parties have abandoned the hierarchical structures that are beneficial
to maintaining internal leadership and power hierarchies, access to state resources, and
attractiveness to coalition partners that define the benefits associated with their political
cartel status. As a result, those parties have experimented with a variety of relatively super-
ficial communication technologies aimed at developing flexible ties with followers (Chad-
wick, 2013; Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016; Gauja, 2016; Scarrow, 2015; Vaccari &
Valeriani, 2016). Following on Margetts (2001) prediction that ‘cyber parties’ would use
technology to strengthen the relationship directly with voters, parties further blur the dis-
tinction between member and supporter to offer diversified affiliation structures (Gauja,
2016) or ‘multispeed’ memberships (Scarrow, 2015). Some pursue hybrid repertoires
aimed at switching between conventional party and social movement modes of communi-
cation and engagement (Chadwick, 2013; see also Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016;
Gibson, 2015; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016). Some innovation has even addressed areas of
intra-party democracy, such as leader and candidate selection and policy development
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processes. Such moves can be observed across the center left and right, although estab-
lished social democratic parties seem more active, particularly in reforms of policy devel-
opment processes (Chiru et al., 2015; Gauja, 2013, 2015, 2016).
Intriguingly, however, much of this technology-enabled innovation serves to reinforce
the conventional model of vertical linkage. Like other organizations facing similar chal-
lenges in what has been termed a post-bureaucratic society (Bimber et al., 2012; Heckscher
& Donnellon, 1994), many parties use technology mainly to reduce the costs of organiz-
ation and communication. In many instances, they embrace enhanced engagement, but
keep it peripheral to principal party operations. Studies in the context of US election cam-
paigns observe strategies of ‘managed interactivity’ (Kreiss, 2012) or ‘controlled interactiv-
ity’ (Stromer-Galley, 2014; see also Jensen, 2017). Invitations for broader input are often
limited to non-binding consultation or decisions on already established alternatives
(Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein, 2017). In all, there is little evidence that such periph-
eral technology-enabled innovation is reversing long-term declines in membership or
voter confidence (van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016). Indeed,
some suggest that half-hearted party organization and participation reforms further dis-
illusion citizens (Della Porta, Fernández, Kouki, & Mosca, 2017, p. 179).
Direct social media communication with voters may produce some marginal advan-
tages for conventional parties, as when UK Labour used social media strategically to par-
tially circumvent the traditional media in the 2017 elections. However, socially mediated
contact between candidates and supporters may be perceived as more genuine (and
replace bureaucratic functions) when coming directly from politicians with thin formal
party organizations, as with Donald Trump’s regular tweeting to growing legions of fol-
lowers (around 30 million) through the 2016 election and afterwards.
The limited effectiveness of center parties chasing discontented voters has either
pushed growing numbers of citizens out of the electoral process, or sent them searching
for alternatives. While some of these emerging parties such as Macron’s En Marche! or
Grillo’s Five Star Movement have spanned the center of the spectrum, many more operate
at the political extremes. To the extent that preferences for direct democratic participation
are more concentrated on a reconfigured left, corresponding forms of party organization
attempting to meet those demands face challenges of interest aggregation, communication
coherence, and scale of voter mobilization – all of which may contribute to a left-right
imbalance of electoral outcomes. This problem of unequal representation (which we
demonstrate empirically below) more generally reflects ways in which preferences for
different forms of organization play out in terms of the character, scale, stability, and
coherence of various political mobilization processes (Dahlberg-Grundberg, 2015; Kavada,
2013). Indeed, we may be entering an era in which different organization and participation
preferences operate as forms of ideology that better distinguish voters on the far left and
right than earlier distinctions about class or economic positions (Bengtsson & Mattila,
2009; Gauja, 2016; Lavezzolo & Ramiro, 2017).
The relatively smaller number of parties (concentrated more on the left) that attempt to
meet the demand for horizontal democratic organization face more challenges than parties
on the radical right that more easily satisfy voter preferences for hierarchy, central leader-
ship, and simpler ethno-nationalist messages. One result of this is that voting rates are
higher on the radical right than the radical left over the last decade, despite higher levels
of most other forms of political participation on the left. We suggest that a contributing
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factor in these trends is a short supply of organizationally acceptable parties on the left.
The following two sections consider these differences in the demand and supply of differ-
ent kinds of political organization in the European context.
Democratic discontent and diverging organizational preferences
As suggested earlier, the factors underlying recent democratic discontent are complex,
interconnected and affect citizens across the ideological left – right spectrum. They include
the continuing crisis of neoliberal capitalism, the growth of economic and political
inequality, economic austerity and market solutions that render life in society precarious
for many citizens, and the overlaid problems of war, climate change, mass migrations and
refugee crises (Crouch, 2004; Harvey, 2007; Klein, 2015; Kriesi, 2012). Such factors under-
pin continuing shifts in the European left-right ideological space around the economy and
social values, reinterpreting the traditional economic dimension of class and the role of
government through divergent left and right responses to globalization, nationalist and
racial identity politics, and welfare nationalism (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008).
This section explores the demand side of the European electoral interface as it plays out
in organizational and communicational terms. As noted above, citizens that self-identify
on the left or right can be broadly expected to differ in terms of preference for horizontal
or vertical forms of political organization (with exceptions, for example of left authoritar-
ians or possibly older generation ideological left voters). The following discussions exam-
ine the underpinnings of different preferences for organizational engagement on the right
and the left.
Organizational preferences on the right
Preferences for vertical or hierarchical organization on the right have long been associated
with higher respect for authority, and related emotional appeals of authoritarianism (Par-
ker & Barreto, 2013). There is less pressure for internal democracy and participation on
the party organizations, which are assumed to have an easier time maintaining centralized
organization (Beyme, 1985; Chiru et al., 2015; Gauja, 2016, chapter 6). The focus on a
delimited set of issues, e.g., concentrated on in-group, nationalist, or racist issue positions,
also favors centralized organization (Mudde, 2007; Parker & Barreto, 2013).
Citizens on the radical right also disproportionately prefer national and cultural uni-
formity anchored in rules, traditions and customs, which makes for a readily available
and consistent set of party positions on the right. We have explored these patterns
using European Social Survey data (ESS 7, v 2.1, 2014, Israel excluded).1 As explained
in more detail in the next section, we defined radical left and radical right according to
the left-right scale break points beyond which people identified with parties on the center
left and center right (e.g., beyond Labour/Social Democrats and Christian Democrats/Lib-
erals). Party positions along a left-right spectrum were scored independently using the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey, also described more fully in the next section. We combined
measures for ‘importance to do what is told and follow rules’ and ‘importance to follow
traditions and customs.’2 Agreement on these combined measures was roughly 40% on
the radical right compared to just 22% the radical left. Even higher levels of agreement
approaching 60% occur on the radical right for the statement that ‘it is better for a country
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if almost everyone shares customs and traditions.’ In contrast, agreement with this state-
ment on the radical left was just above 30%. And 73% of respondents on the radical right
agreed that it is important for immigrants to be committed to the way of life in a country,
contrasted with around 50% on the left. All of these differences are highly significant
(p≤ .0001). These positions play into the simpler nationalist and exclusionary appeals
of parties on the radical right.
Many parties on the radical right began as movements, and some have included calls for
direct democracy (Pauwels, 2014). However, recent studies suggest that citizens on the
right prefer ‘stealth democracy’ (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) that favors efficiency
and expert input over debate and direct participation (Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009; Bowler,
Denemark, Donovan, & McDonnell, 2016; Lavezzolo & Ramiro, 2017; Webb, 2013). This
would imply that engagement preferences continue to be compatible with the leader-cen-
tered and centralized organization of the vertical model. There are of course tensions
between movements and parties, and within parties when factions contest leadership.
For example, in Germany, the anti-Islamic grassroots movement PEGIDA shares a con-
siderable Facebook user base and set of issue frames with the Alternative für Deutschland
party. (Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2017). Early stages of the movement-party
relationship suggested that the party grew by mirroring selective messages of the move-
ment (Rucht, in press). However, leading into the 2017 national elections, party member-
ship rejected calls for a more moderate political course and doubled down on nationalist
and racist positions. This led to losses of some center right support in polls, but consoli-
dated the national leadership around an even more extreme agenda. Internal splits have
characterized other radical European parties on both ends of the spectrum, including
Podemos in 2016 and the Finns Party in 2017.
Organizational preferences on the left
Movements associated with left parties have long raised demands for intra-party democ-
racy, as happened with the ‘fundi’ faction of the German Greens in the 1980s (Gauja, 2016;
Poguntke, 1987). Despite such democratic tensions, the party leadership gradually
adopted cartel strategies aimed at becoming attractive coalition partners, even at the
expense of movement democracy. More recent generation of left parties have faced
even more persistent demands for direct engagement of supporters in core bureaucratic
processes (Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009).
One source of demands for horizontal political organization stems from the globaliza-
tion protest cultures dating from the 1990s. What might be termed a meta-ideology of
diversity and inclusiveness in issue agendas and engagement styles emerged as prominent
themes in the global justice movement and in the World Social Forum and various
regional forums (Smith, 2016). These direct democratic values also spread in later protest
waves such as Occupy Wall Street and the Spanish indignados (15M). Many activists in
these movements resisted high-visibility leadership and bureaucratic organization in
favor of shared authority and direct, deliberative engagement (see Castells, 2012; Della
Porta, 2013; Anduiza, Cristancho, & Sabucedo, 2014; Smith, 2016; Tormey, 2015; Szolu-
cha, 2017).
More broadly, studies of younger, more racially and culturally diverse generations on
the left also indicate disdain for older models of bureaucratic membership and delegated
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representation. Young citizens on the left typically seek faster and more immediate politi-
cal gratification than typically found in conventional party participation (Bang, 2016;
Kreiss, 2014; Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2014; Polletta, 2014). Accordingly, recent move-
ments on the left have not combined as easily with conventional parties and the electoral
arena as have those on the right. Some anti-austerity and anti-corruption protests have
shifted away from conventional national-level party politics, and some have fuelled ‘move-
ment parties,’ often with uneasy relationships to the movements, such as Podemos in Spain
(Della Porta et al., 2017; Casero-Ripollés, Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016).
The question at this point is whether these divergent preferences for political partici-
pation and organization have traveled into the electoral arena, where democracy has its
most important institutional interface with society. The following section explores elec-
toral outcomes in Europe, confirming that there is substantial underrepresentation on
the left in countries for which both ESS data and election results are available. We also
show that a number of counter-hypotheses that might challenge our explanation of diver-
gent democratic engagement preferences cannot explain this imbalance.
Exploring the electoral imbalance in Europe
This section investigates the skewing of the electoral interface in Europe, beginning with
constructing a representation index: a rough indicator of the extent to which different seg-
ments of the electorate connect with and secure proportional representation from parties
during elections. To begin with, we tallied the most recent electoral outcomes for parties
beyond the center (we limited the analysis to European nations with populations of 5
million or more). Parties beyond the traditional center are classified as radical left and rad-
ical right by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.3 According to this independent expert rating
system, at the time of this writing, radical right parties were in parliament in 16 European
countries with populations of 5 million or more, and formed or supported governments in
4 of those (Poland, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland).4 Parties on the radical left were in
parliament in just eight comparable nations, and formed governments in only one of
them (Greece).5
An obvious counter-hypothesis that might explain this imbalance of electoral outcomes
is that various national populations have shifted dramatically to the right. Addressing this
possibility requires determining how to reliably measure national distributions of left-right
political identification and to see how those distributions match up with electoral out-
comes. This entails establishing a baseline measure of political identification that maps
reliably onto party position. We, therefore, constructed a political identification measure
to identify citizens on the radical left and right. Radical right and radical left here refers to
citizens who typically do not identify with parties of the center left (e.g., Labour and Social
Democrats) or center right (e.g., Christian Democrats and Liberals), and who locate them-
selves on the ends of the political spectrum beyond these parties. This is tricky because, as
noted, the political space in Europe is shifting away from classic left-right distinctions,
meaning that left-right self-identification may be perceived differently on individual or
country basis, and some parties reject such labels. Nevertheless, people continue to self-
identify along a left-right continuum. The salient question here is whether those political
identifications map reliably onto the spectrum of radical left and right parties, as estab-
lished independently by the Chapel Hill Expert ratings.6 In other words, we seek to
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establish whether self-identification as radical left or radical right on the ESS survey also
corresponds to ESS measures of identification with parties that are independently judged
radical left or right on the Chapel Hill survey.
Our political identification measure, and other measures presented in this analysis, are
based on the same ESS data introduced above (round 7, 2014, ed. 2.1),7 which is a cross-
national survey of European electorates, conducted bi-annually via extensive face-to-face
interviews. We included 20 countries and a total N of 37,623 in our analysis.8 As is rec-
ommended in the ESS Documentation Report, we applied the ‘post-stratification weights’
as well as ‘population Weights’ to the data in order to take differences in sample sizes as
well as sampling errors into account.9 The political identification measure builds on
respondents’ answers to a question asking them to place themselves on a 0–10 scale of
left to right.10 We then identified break points for political identification score ranges
that fell outside center left (e.g., Social Democrats or Labour) and center right (e.g., Chris-
tian Democrats or Liberals) party identifications. This produced a scale in which 0–2 des-
ignates as radical left, 3–7 as center, and 8–10 as radical right.11 In this scheme, individuals
who merely tilt slightly left or right count as ‘Center.’ We then conducted a validity test to
ascertain that this self-ascribed measure maps reliably onto political parties along the same
continuum by identifying the party with which each respondents most identified, and
scoring that party along an independent left-right party continuum developed by the Cha-
pel Hill Expert Survey of parties, which is based on party issue position. The test confirmed
that the self-ascribed party identification measure correlated strongly (r = .874, p < .0001)
with the independent Chapel Hill party scale.12
The next step was to determine whether the citizens self-identifying on the radical left
and radical right achieve equal representation in terms of party vote shares. We focused
on the above-mentioned nations with populations over 5 million in which parties inde-
pendently classified as radical left (8 nations) or radical right (16 nations) gained more
than 5% of the vote in the most recent election. We constructed a representation index
using the percentages of citizens falling into the radical left and right segments of the
political identification scale and the vote shares of the radical left and right parties
for these nations. We divided the percentages of votes for radical left or right parties
with the percentage of the public who self-identify either as radical left or right based
on our scaling of the ESS data. In this representation index, a national score of 1 theor-
etically indicates perfect representation, meaning that the percentage of votes in a par-
ticular country equals the portion of the electorate that self-identifies at the
corresponding place on the political spectrum. National scores below 1 indicate under-
representation, while results greater than 1 can be understood as overrepresentation.
This is not a perfect measure of electoral representation, but it offers a rough indicator
of the extent to which different segments of the electorate connect with parties during
elections.
We calculated the representation index for the countries included in the 2014 ESS sur-
vey.13 On the radical right, the mean representation ratio of self-identification to party-
vote-share is 1.31, compared to a mean representation ratio of .91 on the radical left.
This represents a 40-point difference in a scale that had an actual range between .41
and 3.37, depending on the country.14 This suggests a substantial electoral imbalance,
in the sense that the radical right is overrepresented and the radical left underrepresented
in relation to citizen self-identification.
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Why would there be under and overrepresentation in the electorates across Europe?We
identified and tested four possible counter-hypotheses that might explain these differ-
ences. All four were eliminated. A fifth hypothesis involving lower voting rates on the
left than the right was also tested. The results support our explanation that the electoral
imbalance reflects organizational and engagement preferences on the left that are not
matched with a supply of parties offering the requisite organizational and engagement
opportunities.
1. There are generally fewer citizens on the radical left than on the radical right.
The first counter-hypothesis addresses the straightforward notion that there might simply
be fewer citizens on the one side than the other. Looking across our entire 20 nation ESS
sample of 37,623, we find that roughly 12.06% identify on the radical left and 12.34%
identify on the radical right, which produces a non-significant difference (p < .278) in a
binomial test. (The country-by-country analysis of proportional representation in nations
with the radical left and right parties in parliaments was conducted in the representation
index reported above.)
2. Trust/confidence in politicians and parties is higher on the left.
The second counter-hypothesis pertains to a general feeling of trust towards political
actors and institutions. It rests on the idea that the radical left may be more satisfied
with the status quo, and therefore more prone to complacency. In order to test this
claim, we cross-tabulated the left-right placement scale with an aggregate of two of the
questions found in the ESS survey, which focus respectively on levels of trust in political
parties, and levels of trust in politicians.15 Respondents who self-identified as radical left
were significantly more likely to hold low levels of trust (63%) than those on the radical
right (54%). Conversely, the radical right was significantly more likely to exhibit high
levels of trust (10%) than the left (6.5%). Both comparisons are significant at p < .0001.
Based on these criteria, it does not seem to be the case that the left is more trusting of
established political actors and institutions; the finding suggests just the opposite. Since
the right is more present in government, this could be expected to boost levels of trust.
However, this still does not explain why the radical left has not produced similar levels
of party electoral support as the right.
3. Satisfaction with government/economy/democracy is higher on the radical left.
Relatedly, the assumption underpinning the third counter-hypothesis is that the radical
right feels more politically and economically marginalized, and therefore less satisfied,
than the left. If the radical left is content with the state of the government and the econ-
omy, we might expect them to be less engaged in elections. We created an aggregate of
three questions tapping government, economic and democratic satisfaction after deter-
mining that all three measures showed similar valences.16 We find that citizens on the rad-
ical left are significantly more likely to hold low levels of satisfaction (56%) than the right
(41%). Conversely, the radical left is far less likely to exhibit high levels of satisfaction, at
10%, compared to 20% on the radical right. All of these differences are statistically
significant at p≤.0001, with similar differences observed for each of the individual items
in the scale.
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4. Political participation is lower on the left.
The fourth counter-hypothesis proposes that generalized disillusionment on the radical
left may produce lower participation rates in various other political activities beyond vot-
ing. Like the others, this hypothesis receives no empirical support. When asked about par-
ticipation and civic engagement activities outside of the realm of electoral politics, the left
is far more active than the center or the radical right. Overall, 22.3% of those identifying as
radical left had participated in demonstrations in the past 12 months, compared to just
6.6% on the radical right. We ran these numbers for various age groups (14–29; 30–49;
50+) and the protest trends were amplified among younger members of the public who
self-identify as radical left, with 28% participating in demonstrations, compared to just
11% for young citizens on the radical right. Looking at another measure of participation,
we found that working in a social organization was significantly higher on the radical left
than on the right (25% compared with 17%), and higher still for citizens under 30 (27%,
contrasted with 15% on the radical right). Again, all of these differences are significant at p
< .0001.
This preliminary analysis suggests that the electoral imbalance implied by the represen-
tation index is not explained by obvious counter-hypotheses about citizen ideology, trust
and satisfaction, or political participation. We have found one interesting data trend that
supports our explanation that citizens are developing preferences for types of democratic
linkage that run counter to what the relevant parties offer. Formulated as a hypothesis, we
predict that citizens on the radical left vote at lower rates (or abstain at higher rates) than
citizens on the radical right.
5. Voting rates are lower (and nonvoting is higher) on the radical left
Confirming this hypothesis, we find that nonvoting is higher on the left than the right, or
to put it in positive terms, voting rates are persistently lower on the radical left over time.
We compared respondents’ reports of whether they had voted in the last national election
in all ESS rounds from one (2002) to seven (2014).17 As shown in Figure 1, voting rates
have been lower on the left, and the gap has increased slightly. For reference, the most
recent difference of 83% vs. 78% is significant at (p < .001). We also looked at regional
variations in these trends. Due to understandable variation in which countries may be
holding more or less contested elections at different points in time, we find the following
regional patterns: the L-R voting gap has closed recently in Central Europe (Czech Repub-
lic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia); the gap has grown in Central Western Europe (Aus-
tria, Switzerland, and Germany) after 2008; the gap has been relatively small (3–5%) but
persistent in Spain and Portugal; the gap is large (8%) and most persistent in North Wes-
tern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden); and it is large and growing larger
(10%) in Western Europe (Belgium, France, UK, Ireland, Netherlands).
These data, in the context of the above hypotheses and the earlier analysis suggest that
the supply of parties on the radical right better meets voter demand for types of organiz-
ational engagement than parties on the left. Some of this gap may be due to greater range
and complexity of issues on the left, but this factor is difficult to disentangle from the par-
ticipatory preferences on the left for more diversity and inclusiveness and deliberative
engagement aimed at democratically addressing the diversity of issues. Indeed, the press-
ures emanating from globalization and austerity protest movements for parties that reflect
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those engagement values has led to the creation of interesting forms of what we term con-
nective parties that aim to bring followers into core bureaucratic processes of agenda set-
ting and candidate selection via mixes of offline and online routines. As discussed in the
next section, although some of these technology-driven parties have found success, others
have struggled to achieve both scale and credibility among followers.
Connective parties and their challenges
This section turns to the supply side of the electoral interface to explore attempts to
organize voter-party-campaign linkage in more horizontal forms, with emphasis on
organizational and ideational inclusiveness. Pioneering parties are implementing such
models on the basis of technology-enabled organization, which offers the potential for
organizational innovation at large scale. However, the early evidence indicates that such
parties face old dilemmas with new twists. It is difficult for them to meet internal demand
and at the same time compete successfully in the current electoral arena which still favors
organization and communicational forms from earlier eras of party democracy. To the
extent that the supply side cannot deliver on the horizontal model in the contemporary
context, this can be expected to further skew the electoral interface.
This section focuses on connective parties, which go further than other organizationally
hybrid parties to develop technology infrastructures that are integral to core party oper-
ations. We define connective parties as organizations in which technology platforms and
affordances are indistinguishable from, and replace, key components of brick and mortar
organization and intra-party functions. These components include affiliation manage-
ment, policy generation, leader and candidate selection, and public communication.
Other scholars have discussed the growing role of technology in new parties that face
various organizational challenges. We note in particular, Haberer’s (2017) pioneering
Figure 1. Voting rates reported in ESS data, 2002–2014.
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work in identifying the origins and workings of what she terms ‘net-parties’. We prefer the
designation of connective parties to distinguish a particular set of organizations that dis-
play distinctive theoretical properties. In particular, connective parties: (1) cannot func-
tion organizationally without technology platforms (in contrast with more conventional
parties discussed earlier that use internet technologies in more peripheral ways); (2)
engage supporter networks in connective action that affects the core operations of the
party organization (i.e., not just mobilizing votes); and (3) can be located as an extensions
of organizationally enabled forms of connective action in the earlier theoretical framework
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).
While there are growing numbers of these kinds of organizations, space prohibits an
exhaustive review. We have selected illustrative cases that include national-level parties
that display diverse comparative properties, ranging from northern to southern Europe,
and occupying different positions on a left-right continuum (although, for reasons out-
lined earlier, these parties tend to skew left). Most importantly, all of our cases have
adopted technology to serve core organizational functions, although they differ in
terms of particular organizational technology adoptions and the precise manner in
which they combine horizontal and vertical elements. These cases are: Spanish Podemos
(established 2014, entered national parliament 2015); Italian Five Star Movement (M5S)
(established 2009, entered national parliament 2013); Danish Alternativet (established
2013, entered national parliament 2015); the Icelandic Píratar (established 2012 follow-
ing the Pirate Party model, entered national parliament 2013). We also discuss a local
connective party, Barcelona en Comú, to assess whether some of the organizational
issues confronted on the national scale can be better addressed in smaller scale deploy-
ments. It is important to note that these parties are all moving targets with respect to
their ideological positioning, their organizational structure and infrastructure, and, cru-
cially, the extent to which they implement or dismantle the mechanisms for inclusive
engagement and sharing authority that defines their location in a horizontal organiz-
ation model over time.
All of these parties purport to pursue a new way of doing (party) politics. As part of this,
they explicitly reject ideological positioning on the conventional left-right scale (Alterna-
tivet, 2017a; Five Star Movement, 2016, 2017a; Podemos, 2016). This said, the two larger
parties have come to attract support concentrated to particular parts of the ideological
spectrum. Podemos increasingly attracts left-identifying supporters, while the M5S has
stabilized with support across a broader spectrum of left-center-right, with those differ-
ences registering on various issues such as immigration, labor market policies and the
EU (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016; Della Porta et al., 2017).
The public documents of these parties emphasize the importance of generating new
political ideas from the bottom up (or from the citizen periphery to the party center).
Inclusiveness, participation and transparency are central (Alternativet, 2017b; Five Star
Movement, 2016, 2017a; Píratar, 2016, 2017, principles 6.1–6.3; Podemos, 2016, pp. 7–
10). While Alternativet aims to develop a new political culture and ‘living everyday democ-
racy’ (Alternativet, 2017a), the others stress the importance of keeping political represen-
tatives within democratic control. The M5S in particular promotes the notion of an
unfiltered process in which citizens enact politics without intermediaries. Party represen-
tatives, drawn from the citizenry, act as the direct extension of popular will, with extensive
obligations to follow the party line and report to their constituencies (Five Star Movement,
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2017b; see also Podemos, 2016, pp. 9–10; Píratar, 2016, 2017). The priority is to facilitate
an association of citizens rather than build a team of professional politicians.
The parties, therefore, pursue radically revised ways of organizing linkage and engage-
ment. All have different ideas and systems for how to share authority and draw in periph-
eral input. M5S and Píratar place more emphasis on direct democracy, while Podemos and
Alternativet stress the formative and deliberative development of ideas. They combine ver-
tical and horizontal elements in complex ways. Table 1 outlines key mechanisms as the
parties describe them in Spring 2017, showing that all purport to implement mechanisms
that are designed to enable inclusive input in party processes, and shared authority
between members and party leadership in party functions such as policy development,
and candidate selection. All require membership or the equivalent for decision-making,
but ‘membership’ requires very little, and non-members can contribute to discussions
and ideas along the way. As noted below, there has been significant debate among suppor-
ters about the degree to which these connective mechanisms are genuine, or whether they
mask a more controlling central leadership (such concerns have created tensions in Pode-
mos and M5S).
The point (and challenge) for all of these parties is to build the capacity for flexibility,
shared authority, and breadth and depth of engagement in a robust form at scale. To
this end, the parties aim to build technology solutions to enable collaboration and
decision-making at large scale and in combination with executive action. The range
of custom-built or commercial digital affordances (including some overlap with less
connective parties), includes: (a) platforms for general party communication such as
party websites, wikis, and blogs; (b) social media, which make it possible for party actors
to maintain controlled accounts while enabling supporters to leverage their own social
networks; (c) specialized applications for proposing, discussing, and decision-making
such as Discourse (discussion platform), Appgree (large-scale communication and
Table 1. Technology-enabled organization in four connective parties.
Affiliation
Candidate selection








workshops > Online hearing > Online
vote > (Continuous online validation)
Online consultation
www.alternativet.dk
Link to AlleOS operating system.
AlleOS operating system; including Dialog





Online idea and discussion forum
Online consultation and validation
(particular focus legislation proposals)
www.Movimento5.stella.it;
including Forum; Login to Rousseau
operating system.






Policy proposals: In-house meetings >
Online discussion > Online vote
https://piratar.is;
Links to Discourse.piratar.is (discussion





Citizen proposals: Compilation phase >
Online endorsement phase >
Development phase > Online vote
https://podemos.info;
Including the Participa portal with link to
Plaza Podemos 2.0.
Plaza Podemos 2.0; including ICP (Citizen
proposals); Debates y Opinión (debate
forum)
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consensus software); and (d) online platforms or ‘operating systems’ to organize the key
technology outlays.
For most of these parties, their technology-enabled organization is a moving target both
in terms of the technology development and organizational process. The operating sys-
tems, the individual mechanisms and processes they underpin are still under construction
and experimentation. Alternativet provides good examples of the rapid changes. The
design and technology of the idea and policy generating process has been tweaked several
times since the public launch of the party, including an early decision to shift from party-
seeded to grassroots-initiated idea incubation groups (Ringblom, n.d.). The national policy
process as set out in the party Handbook in 2017 (Alternativet, 2017b) moves across three
phases. The initiation phase starts at grassroots level, including open offline Political Lab-
oratories (PoLabs) that workshop an issue. If the initiating group develops a proposal, the
ensuing hearing phase involves a period of open digital commentary and validation
through the Dialog platform (built on Discourse software) in the AlleOS operating system.
Policy proposals that receive sufficient member support pass directly to the Political Cat-
alogue for political representatives to consult, and remain continuously open to member
assessment online in an ongoing verification phase. Proposed contributions to the party
program also require the consideration and support (at 80%) of the closed Political
Forum (PoFo) committee during the hearing phase, and remain continuously open to
PoFo re-assessment. In this and other cases, face-to-face components play an important
part, and the process is intended to be open, accessible and transparent.
Connective parties also typically incorporate overlapping and relatively autonomous
layers in party organization and communication, which contribute to the impression of
a fluid structure. Our local case, Barcelona en Comú, which formed a municipal govern-
ment in 2015, offers a good example of the complexity and dynamism of such arrange-
ments. The party combines executive leadership with autonomous local groups and
informal supporter networks (Haberer & Peña López, 2016). Analysis of social media
communication in the 2015 election highlights how the different components can be
mutually reinforcing. The Twitter accounts of the party and its candidates produced the
most centralized retweet networks of any party in the local election. At the same time,
highly developed crowd-enabled supporter networks engaged movement activists in
party-related communication outside the formal party networks. Rather than a formal
campaign strategy, this dual social media network seemed to reflect activist preferences
to remain independent of formal party operations and party acceptance of this arrange-
ment (Aragon, Volkovich, Laniado, & Kaltenbrunner, 2016). Although there was strong
agreement on issue agendas between party and movement during the election, these par-
allel media spheres illustrate the role autonomous networks can play in connective parties.
Perhaps even more, this case illustrates the desires of many movement activists to operate
somewhat independently of formal party communication processes. In other cases, such as
the Finns Party, the existence of parallel communication networks present greater chal-
lenges for control of party issue profiles and identity (see Hatakka, 2016).
Of all the tensions present in connective parties, perhaps the greatest source of instabil-
ity is the degree to which they offer or withdraw mechanisms for inclusive engagement or
sharing authority. Although still in many respects a connective party, Podemos had moved
decisively away from the horizontal model by 2016. M5S to a certain extent moved in the
opposite direction, although practices such as excommunicating party representatives
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have kept the organization within bounds set by the leadership. In part, such trajectories
reflect the internal and external pressures that connective party organizations grapple with
at an electoral interface that continues to favor more conventionally organized parties.
Challenges for connective parties
Connective parties that attempt to develop horizontal models potentially offer a response
to voter demand for greater engagement at the electoral interface. However, their capacity
to balance inclusive and meaningful participation and shared authority with coherent and
robust organization is open to question. Organizational innovation easily becomes limited
by the need to control the quality of ideas, sensibly aggregate preferences, monitor the
legitimacy of decision processes, and coordinate the input of different groups of partici-
pants, leaders and supporters. Such problems on the supply side may contribute to skew-
ing the electoral interface in many contemporary democracies, amplifying the
underrepresentation of the parts of the electorate that develop preferences for a horizontal,
direct democratic party model. We note three key areas in which connective parties face
internal and external challenges.
One internal challenge has to do with the sheer complexity of building technological
underpinnings for spaces and processes that inclusively and coherently operationalize
shared authority, particularly at scale. It is difficult to design platforms, processes and
infrastructure that incorporate specific values such as ideal deliberative standards
(Borge & Santamarina, 2016; Haberer & Peña-López, 2016); appropriate expertise (Paulin,
2014); or ‘open’ spaces (Husted & Plesner, in press). Observers note that even in connec-
tive parties with horizontal aspirations, the invitation to broaden input is often limited in
practice to pre-defined alternatives or particular areas (e.g., local issues but not national),
and even then, there is little connection to executive outcomes (Della Porta et al., 2017;
Rendueles & Sola, 2015). Moreover, complex systems of meaningful engagement in
local groups are difficult to build at scale. Both participants and platforms may become
overwhelmed when numbers increase. The German Pirate Party suffered collapse after
its ‘liquid feedback’ and ‘liquid democracy’ platforms became overwhelmed with input
that magnified differences and offered little mechanism for their resolution (Haberer,
2017; Paulin, 2014). Such issues make it difficult for parties to deliver on promises of
unmediated or unfiltered processes. In more stable parties, the actual mediation involved
in the technology-enabled processes may not be apparent for participants.
A second internal challenge is how to combine diverse participants and levels of par-
ticipation in fluid structures. This challenge is most demanding for connective parties
that emphasize open policy development and intra-party democracy. As noted above,
inclusiveness in core organizational processes remains a persistent source of tension.
Complicating the issue of who can participate under specific conditions, is frequent
lack of agreement on what the ideal of broad inclusion actually entails. Several studies
note ongoing negotiations among participants around the issues of who ought to have
access to information and decision-making in internal processes, which may create con-
flicts between temporary supporters and dedicated members, more or less active partici-
pants, and on-site group activists and online registered supporters (Borge & Santamarina,
2016; Haberer & Peña-López, 2016). In practice, broad inclusion through technology plat-
forms can be perceived as something that undermines the privilege of committed
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participants, a theme observed previously in both protests and party affiliation reforms
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, chapter 6; Gauja, 2016; Scarrow, 2013, 2015).
These studies indicate the difficulty of designing processes and organizations, virtual
and material, that temper the emergence of informal clusters and hierarchies in which
the participation of some impedes the inclusion of others (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). This
problem is amplified in media-rich environments with mixed modes of participation
that link face-to-face meetings with digital input (see Mattoni, forthcoming). Stretching
policy processes across multiple arenas with distinct norms and characteristics (size, open-
ness, meeting structures, temporalities, online, and offline interactions) exposes proposals
to various inputs and treatments, and may discourage participants who are not equally
comfortable with different phases of the processes. For example, some Alternativet partici-
pants reported that the phases of technology-based deliberation disrupted what they felt
had been initiated in the face-to-face settings of the PoLabs (Husted & Plesner, in press;
see also Haberer & Peña-López, 2016). In general, as found in other party and movement
contexts, a small number of participants are particularly active in the party and on the
platform, and in some cases, broader participation has decreased over time (Casero-
Ripollés et al., 2016; Della Porta et al., 2017). This said, some ‘inactive’ members report
that they do not want to be actively involved, but like being part of a party that is organized
in this way (Andersen, 2016).
In many ways, these organizational challenges contribute to a third challenge, that is
often the most visible one: how to share authority between the membership and the execu-
tive party leadership in a stable manner. Part of this problem can be traced to the external
pressures of electoral competition, which typically requires visible leaders and communi-
cation with broad voter populations in an arena dominated by conventional news media.
These pressures are magnified by competition with more hierarchical parties. In this con-
text, goals such as campaign effectiveness and shared authority easily conflict, leading to
tensions regarding the autonomy of distributed groups. These pressures help account for
why many of these parties are moving targets in terms of forms of horizontal organization.
For example, Podemos in its early phase revolved around autonomous Círculos (local or
thematic groups) as its basic organizational unit, and the public party documents still
nominally assert this to be the case (Podemos, 2016, Article 6; 2017, Organizational Prin-
ciple 5). Yet in practice, the 2014 Constitutional Assembly substantially revised internal
roles to tone down the role of Círculos in favor of a more centralized organization
aimed at waging more coherent election campaigns. These shifts away from constituent
organizational models favored by many 15M movement forerunners have produced sub-
sequent splits among leadership and followers (Borge & Santamarina, 2016; Casero-
Ripollés et al., 2016; Della Porta et al., 2017, pp. 78–80, pp. 122–125; Rendueles & Sola,
2015).
Ironically, the multi-layered, flexible organization of the connective party can in prac-
tice render the role of citizen input unclear. Although implementing a fluid system with
multiple layers of action is typically part of the point, the complexity of multiple spaces
running in parallel can challenge coherence (see Haberer & Peña-López, 2016). The result-
ing fuzziness may enhance the role of the party leader instead of the grassroots. Podemos
leader Pablo Iglesias quickly dominated the public agenda with a combination of publicity,
television talk show appearances, a YouTube talk show, and other controlled media for-
mats. Similarly, inM5S, unclear rules about the connections between formal and informal
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arenas reinforced Beppe Grillo’s role as chief megaphone at the national level (Bordignon
& Ceccarini, 2015; Casero-Ripollés et al., 2016; Della Porta et al., 2017). Overall, several
studies observe that party rhetoric about broad participation and technology can obscure
a dearth of participatory opportunity, or at least a tension between the ideals and the prac-
tice (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015; Della Porta et al., 2017; Haberer & Peña-López, 2016;
Treré & Barassi, 2015).
These pressures of competition and institutionalization (including expectations about
party functions such as candidate development), have previously eroded meaningful
engagement in movement parties (Haberer, 2017; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011). It is precisely
for such reasons that the comparative party literature expects that alternative party organ-
izations will adapt to conventional bureaucratic models or dissolve (Poguntke et al., 2016).
All this suggests that connective parties trying to implement innovative horizontal organ-
izational formats at scale offer interesting responses to citizen demands, but face signifi-
cant challenges. Indeed, maintaining shared authority and inclusive, meaningful
engagement become challenging in direct relation to efforts of these parties to deliver
on core aims such as: inclusive participation, managing technological input coherently,
and attaining enough scale to compete effectively in elections.
Conclusion
This analysis started with a puzzle about the electoral imbalance in many mature democ-
racies. Examining the electoral interface through the lens of organization, communication
and technology highlights important citizen demand-side and party supply-side dimen-
sions of the democratic interface that are undergoing change. Preliminary evidence pre-
sented here suggests a two-fold picture. Emerging ideological preferences on the left for
direct or deliberative democracy create organizational preferences for horizontal models
of democratic linkage that run counter to the models typically offered by parties. At the
same time, the conventional configuration of a vertical party model (often with interesting
movement-driven hybrid communication processes) seems to favor the emerging ethno-
nationalist right.
However, all of these developments are circling a centrist political order that is losing
legitimacy. It appears that the democratic clock is ticking. As noted, growing numbers of
younger citizens in Europe and the US say that living in a democracy is less important
compared with previous generations (Foa & Mounk, 2016). Even among those who con-
tinue to think that democracy is the best form of government, the electoral dimension is
especially criticized (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016). Citizens are disillusioned with ‘politics as
usual’ and are disconnecting from the traditional governing parties of both center left
and center right. They increasingly resist the professionalized marketing style of twentieth
century campaign communication that defined what Blumler and Kavanagh (1999)
termed the third age of political communication. These and other developments have
led observers to point to a legitimacy crisis of contemporary democracy (Castells, 2013;
Della Porta, 2013; Mair, 2013).
At the very least, it appears that we are now entering a fourth age of media politics, in
which familiar patterns of communication, organization and citizen engagement no
longer apply – or at least do not apply very convincingly (Blumler, 2016a, 2016b). This
emerging communication age is as yet ill-defined, but it seems marked by the growing
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chaos of multiple public spheres in which the spin of conventional parties and politicians
interacts often chaotically with new forms of organization enabled by technology plat-
forms and socially mediated information production and distribution. These hybrid for-
mations often lack the coherent boundaries and organizational control of modern
institutions such as parties and press organizations. While challenges exist on both the
left and right ends of the political spectrum, party organizations on the right more closely
resemble conventional bureaucratic models. Some of these are thin organizations centered
around strong leaders who dominate party decision processes and communication. Such
vertical models compete relatively more effectively in the legacy interfaces that remain
from modern democratic electoral processes.
All of this raises questions for and about connective parties. Above all, can they scale up
and still retain their defining characteristics? How can they compete more effectively
against vertical model parties? Can they even compete with other hybrid forms that
may emerge in particular situations. For example, in the US, Donald Trump did not
have a formal party (although he entered a marriage of convenience with the Republicans),
but he had a large social media following that interacted with a right wing media sphere,
producing a kind of hybrid political organization in the 2016 election and afterward. Simi-
larly, Emmanuel Macron’s EnMarche! Party was something of a short-order, custom-built
organization that captured broad centrist discontent with established parties in France in
2017. This suggests that in the unstable conditions faced by many democracies, the search
for a new model of parties and elections may be missing the point that digital and social
media, mixed with citizen discontent, offer the potential for once unlikely factions and lea-
ders to quickly attain national prominence. Such uses of technology in emerging center-
right movements may be more matters of convenience, serving as transitional phases
toward other forms of organization. In this context, the quest on the left for organizational
forms that create direct or deliberative democracy may prove overly idealistic. Indeed, it
seems that the quest to create idealized participatory experiences may result in losing
sight of other critical issues, including emerging threats to democracy itself.
Our analysis also raises larger questions for the electoral interface. The connective par-
ties are moving targets, but so to a certain extent is the interface. The key question
addressed here is, at heart, not one of political ideology, but of linkage. There is a need
to further examine how a fourth age of media politics may condition the electoral interface
with respect to its core organizational and communicational processes. As citizens increas-
ingly seek alternatives to center parties (and the press systems that carry their spin), how
might electoral and informational linkages be reinvented? Clearly, the fascinating exper-
iments with horizontal connective parties suggest serious citizen reform efforts from the
bottom up. However, there remains a gap between achieving alternative linkage practices
based on intra-party democracy, and engaging enough voters to win elections within the
constraints of current legacy election and communication processes. Perhaps new direc-
tions will emerge for more conventional parties that help them improve relations with
supporters. For example, one variation that has been illuminated in the context of advo-
cacy organizations is the practice of collecting ‘passive democratic feedback’ (Karpf, 2012;
2016). This entails organizations using advanced analytics to listen to registered suppor-
ters in order to tweak issues and infrastructure for supporters to act upon.
As democracies experience increasing turbulence due to the continuing hollowing of
the center and the rise of radical alternatives, it may be that citizens will sacrifice some
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preferences about linkage and engagement in order to stem threats to personal liberties,
social diversity, and equity-based social policies. It remains to be seen whether new tech-
nology-based organizational forms will yield stable, scalable and resilient parties that can
fulfil the function of linkage while competing electorally and governing responsibly. At
present, however, while citizens are engaging in a variety of creative experiments, often
involving impressive numbers, there appears to be an impasse when it comes to addressing
the imbalance at the electoral interface.
Notes
1. ESS Round 7: European Social Survey Round 7 Data (2014). Data file edition 2.1. NSD –Nor-
wegian Centre for Research Data, Norway –Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS
ERIC. The Documentation Report is available online at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.
org/.
2. The measure used here is based on a variable aggregated out of the results for ESS 7 ques-
tionnaire variables ‘ipfrule: Important to do what is told and follow rules,’ and ‘imptrad:
Important to follow traditions and customs.’ Both were weighted equally at 1/2. The results
were originally measured on a six-point scale and were compiled into the categories of
‘Agree,’ (1–2) ‘Ambiguous,’ (3–4) ‘Disagree,’ (5–6), and ‘NA.’
3. As based on classifications by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES; Bakker et al., 2015).
4. Poland, Law & Justice (37.6 %, 2015); Switzerland, People’s Party (29.4 %, 2015; Denmark,
People’s Party (21.1 %, 2015); Austria, Freedom Party (20.5 %, 2013); Hungary, Jobbik
(20.4 %, 2014); Finland, Finns Party (17.6, 2015); Slovakia, Slovak National (8.6 %) & People’s
Party (8.0 %, 2016); Norway, Progress (16.3 %, 2013); France, National Front (13.6 %, 2012);
UK, UKIP (12.6 %, 2015); Sweden, Sweden Democrats (12.8 %, 2014); Netherlands, Freedom
Party (10.1 %, 2012; 13.1%, 2017); Serbia, Serbian Radical Party (8.1 %, 2016); Bulgaria,
Patriot Front (7.3 %, 2014); Greece, Golden Dawn 7 %, 2015); and Czech Republic, Dawn
of Direct Democracy (6.8 %, 2013). Source: ElectionGuide (www.electionguide.org)
5. Greece, SYRIZA (35.5 %) & Communist (5.5 %, 2015); Spain, Podemos-IU (21.1 %, 2016);
Portugal, Left Bloc (BE) (10.6 %) & DemUnity (8.6 %, 2015); Netherlands, Socialist (9.7 %,
2012; 9.1, 2017); Germany, The Left (8.6 %, 2013); Finland, Left Alliance (7.1, 2015); France,
Left Front, (6.9 %, 2012); and Sweden, Left Party (5.7 %, 2014). Source: ElectionGuide.
6. In this context, we trace the radical left and radical right (as categorized by CHES) and not
the occurrence of populism. To the extent that populism is conceived as a thin ideology that
applies across the political spectrum (Mudde, 2004), it focuses a related but distinct dimen-
sion of the puzzle at the heart of the present analysis.
7. ESS Round 7, edition 2.1.
8. Countries included in the sample were: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic,
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland,
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia. The entire sample
in the 2014 round, excluding Israel, totaled 37,623 responses.
9. We created a new weight variable, which is the product of multiplying the post-stratification
and populations weight figures (variable name: ‘PSPWGHT × PWEIGHT’).
10. ‘B19. In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, where would you
place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?’ (European Social
Survey, 2014).
11. We aggregate the options of ‘Refusal,’ ‘Don’t know,’ and ‘no answer,’ as ‘NA’ in subsequent
analyses.
12. We constructed the validity test as follows: First, we assigned party identification scores to the
political party to which each respondent said s/he felt close, creating a score between 0 and 10
for each political party included in the ESS national surveys. (Question B18a: ‘Is there a par-
ticular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?’ (ESS Source Questionnaire,
2014, p. 8) Next, we identified an independent reference score for those same parties by
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consulting CHES, which places political parties on a scale of 0 (left) to 10 (right) based on
experts’ ratings of parties on given points of position, issues and ideology. When we com-
pared these two measurements, the results showed a very strong correlation (r = 0.874,
p≤ .0001) between these two independent estimates of party position. We interpret this
to mean that political identification, that is, left-center-right self-identification contained
in the ESS data, maps reliably onto corresponding party positioning along the same
continuum.
13. This ESS survey included 12 of the 16 nations in which parties on the radical right
gained more than 5% vote share and 7 out of the 8 countries with winning parties on
the radical left For the right, these countries were Poland, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria,
Hungary, Finland, Norway, France, the UK, Sweden, Netherlands, and the Czech Repub-
lic. For the left, they were Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Germany, Finland, France, and
Sweden. Note that the party vote shares were obtained for national elections ranging
from 2012 to 2015, but political self-identification survey data were not available for
each election year.
14. For countries with left parties in parliament, the representation range ran from a low of .41
(Sweden) to a high of 1.29 (Finland). For countries with right parties in parliament, the rep-
resentation range was from .47 (Czech Republic) to 3.37 (Austria).
15. We cross-tabulated the left-right placement scale with an aggregate of ESS 7 questionnaire
points B5 (trust in political parties) and B6 (trust in politicians), which were weighted equally
at 1/2. The original results, which were measured on a ten-point scale, were compiled into the
categories of ‘Low,’ (0–3) ‘Mid,’ (4–6) ‘High,’ (7–10), and ‘NA.’
16. This variable presents an aggregate of the results for ESS 7 questionnaire points B21 (satis-
faction with country’s economy), B22 (satisfaction with country’s government), and B23 (sat-
isfaction with the way democracy works in country), which were all weighted equally at 1/3.
The results were originally measured on a ten-point scale and were compiled into the cat-
egories of ‘Low,’ (0–3) ‘Mid,’ (4–6) ‘High,’ (7–10), and ‘NA.’
17. Question B9: ‘Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in
the last [country] national election in [month/year]?’ (ESS Source Questionnaire 2014, p. 7).
Here we used the subsample of countries included in ESS 7 survey (excl. Isreal), most of
which were also featured in all of the previous ESS rounds: Austria (excl. ESS 4–6), Belgium,
Switzerland, Czech Republic (excl. ESS 3), Germany, Denmark, Estonia (excl. ESS 1), Spain,
Finland, France, UK, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania (excl. ESS 1–4), Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia
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